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Wright: The Doctrine of Advancements

The Doctrine of Advancements
M.
I.

DONALD WRIGlT, JR.*

INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY

The history of the doctrine of advancements is uncertain.
Writers are unable to precisely trace its origin.' However, Blackstone lends some inkling as to the possible sources in the following
statement:
"This just and equitable provision hath been also said to
be derived from the collatior bonorum [comingling of property
for the purpose of equal division] of the imperial law: which
it certainly resembles in some points through it differs in others.
But it may not be amiss to observe that with regard to goods
and chattels, this is part of the ancient custom of London, of
the province of York, and our sister kingdom of Scotland: and
with regard to lands descending in coparceny; that it hath always been and still is, the common law of England, under the
name of 'hotchpot'."'
The earliest legislation that positively includes the doctrine of advancements as a part of the law of intestate succession is the English
Statute of Distributions,3 and it is believed by scholars that this
provision was derived from the collatio bonarum as indicated by
Blackstone. The idea of this segment of the Roman law was that
an emancipated son or daughter, who had previously received a
dowry, could claim a child's share in its father's estate provided that
the son account for all the property he had accumulated and the
daughter account for her dowry.' Whatever may be its source and
derivation, advancement has presented a theme upon which legislation has been enacted in almost every jurisdiction in this country.
II.

DEFINITION

The concept of advancements being purely statutory in its origin,
any definition of the doctrine must depend upon legislation for its
* Member, West Virginia State Bar.

'Elbert, Advancements, 51 MIcH. L. REv. 665 (1953).

22 BLAcKsTONp-, COMMENTARIES *517.

322 & 23 Car. II, c. 10 (1670).
4 BucKLAND, PRIVATE RoMAN LAW 198 (2d ed. 1939).
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force as a legal doctrine, and thus the term is incapable of a precise
universal definition. Typical of the definitions propounded by the
courts is that advanced by the Illinois court in Grattin v. Grattin
when the term was defined as ".... the giving by the intestate in
his lifetime, by anticipation, the whole or part of what it is supposed
the donee will be entitled to on the death of the person making it."6
West Virginia has no statute which defines the term "advancement,"
but the West Virginia court has stated the applicable law as follows:
"By the word advancement . . . is meant a gift by a parent to a
child or descendant for the purpose of advancing him in life .... ,,7
A modem case defines the term in this more complete fashion:
"An advancement is an irrevocable gift made by a parent
or ancestor, during the lifetime of either, to one standing in the
place of a prospective heir or distributee, with the intention
on the part of the donor that such gift shall represent a part
or the whole of the share of his estate to which the donee would
become entitled on the death of the donor intestate."'
The basic assumption of the doctrine is that the law of intestate
succession has, as its function, the making of a distribution conformable to the desires of the decedent, and as a corollary to this
function that a normal decedent wishes to treat his offspring with
equality.9 Thus it follows that when the parent makes a distribution during his lifetime to his child, this is considered as having
been made in anticipation of the intestate share which the child
would receive on the death of the ancestor. Such advances to the
child must then be taken into consideration in the final intestate
distribution in order to preserve the assumed intended equality.
There are areas where various jurisdictions are not in accord
as to the particulars of the doctrine. These areas concern mainly
(a) the role of intent in relation to advancements; (b) the persons who may make and who are chargeable with advancements;
(c) the type of transaction which constitutes an advancement; (d)
S6 18 III.
(8 Peck) 167-(1856). Accord, Dame's Ex'r v. Lloyd, 82 Va. 859, 5 S.E. 87 (1887).
7
Waldron v. Taylor, 52 W. Va. 284, 45 S.E. 336 (1903). Note that
this definition is confined to children and descendants and on the basis of
this decision, the legislature has added to the statute the term "collateral
relatives."
8
Hedrick v. Harper, 135 W. Va. 47, 57, 62 S.E.2d 265, 269 (1950).
9See Grattan v. Grattan, 18 Ill. (8 Peck) 167 (1856); Novels v. Davenport, 183 N.C. 207, 111 S.E. 180 (1922).
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transactions which are not considered to be advancements; (e) the
function of certain stated presumptions; and (f) the application of
the doctrine to cases of partial intestacy on the part of the advancor.
These facets will be considered, with particular emphasis placed on
the local problems, in the order in which they have been enumerated.
III.

THE FUNCTION OF INTENTION

In a majority of jurisdictions, the rule is that the intent of
the advancor at the time of the transaction is determinative in ascertaining whether a transfer is or is not an advancement.' ° West
Virginia is in accord with this view, the court stating that where,
in the distribution of the estate of an intestate father, it is claimed
that title to certain property was conferred to his children by way
of advancement, the solution to the problem depends upon the intention of the father in disposing of the property, which intent is
ascertained from the evidence and the surrounding circumstances."
The concern for intent here is apparently a corrolary to the
general principle that a person has a right to dispose of his property
as he pleases. If a person intends to advance a portion of his estate
to one who would otherwise succeed to it at his death, the usual
view is that such intent should resolve the issue.2 The case of
McClanahan v. McClanahan," one of the leading West Virginia
cases, quotes at length from the Virginia case of Watkins v. Young"'
to the effect that an unexplained gift from a father to one of his
children, the father later dying intestate, is presumed to be an advancement. The court said:
"In some of the states it is held that a gift of any considerable amount is prima facie an advancement, and is to be treated,
in case the party to whom the advancement was made comes
in for a distributive share, as a debt due from him to the
estate. [Citations omitted] In other states it has been held
that a mere gift, unexplained, by father to child, does not
make even a prima facie case in favor of an advancement,
10 E.g., Barron v. Barron, 181 Ga. 505, 182 S.E. 851 (1935); McCabe
v. Broeme, 107 Md. 490, 69 At. 259 (1908); Rowe v. Rowe, 144 Va. 816,

130 S.E. 771 (1925).

" McClanahan v. McClanahan, 36 W. Va. 34, 14 S.E. 419 (1892);
Roberts v. Coleman, 37 W. Va. 143, 16 S.E. 482 (1892).
11Holland v. Bonner, 142 Ark. 214, 218 S.W. 665 (1920).
"3 36 W. Va. 34, 14 S.E. 419 (1892).
1472 Va. (31 Gratt.) 84 (1878).
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but that there must be some evidence of intention to treat it
as an advancement beyond the unexplained act. [Citations
omitted]
"But, whatever conflict may seem to exist on this question,
all the cases agree that a gift in the lifetime of the intestate,
unexplained, is only a presumption in favor of an advancement,
and makes only a prima facie case which may be rebutted
by the evidence."1
Upon this information, the court in the McClanahan case decided
that the question of whether there was an advancement depended
upon the intent of the advancor.' 6 Thus it would appear that the
West Virginia court has adopted the intent theory.
More difficult is the question of the scope of inquiry to be
made in determining this intent. The McClanahan case states that
intent is to be ascertained from the evidence and the surrounding
circumstances, but the syllabus of the case adds to this statement,
and says that the circumstances are ". . . the value of his entire estate,
the number of his children, etc."' 7 Text-writers list various elements
which may be admitted in order to adduce the intent of the intestate. Atkinson makes the following statement concerning the
problem:
"Of course the determination of the subjective intent of a deceased person is not an easy matter. Express declarations of
the parent are admissible for the purpose of discovering his
intent, as are his books of account. The surrounding circumstances may also be considered. The extent of the property
given is a pertinent factor . . .,"
West Virginia law has followed the McClanahan case although
this appears to be the only statement by the court as to what constitutes surrounding circumstances. Parol testimony is admitted to
explain such circumstances, 9 and direct statements of the parent
as to his intent, whether made at the time of the gift or subsequently
are admitted on this issue.2" It would thus appear that the courts
's
5d.,
at 88.
6
at 45.
11 8 Ibid.
1'Id.,

ATKINSON, WrLLS § 129 (2d ed. 1953).

19MeClanahan v. McClanahan, 36 W. Va. 34, 14 S.E. 419 (1892).
oGaylord v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 122 W. Va. 205, 8 S.E.2d 189
(1940).
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in both Virginia and West Virginia liberally allow any evidence to
be introduced which will have some relevancy as to the subjective
intent of the advancor at the time he made the gift. 1
IV.

PARTIES TO THE TRANSACTION

Various statutes impose different limitations on the persons
who may make and who are chargeable with advancements. The
doctrine of advancements in its most common application concerns
the transaction between parent and child, but it is not limited in its
scope to such persons. As to such gifts it is interesting to note that
in the early development of the concept of advancements the courts
were faced with the difficulty of determining whether a transfer
from a mother to a child was an advancement. An English court22
pointed out that the doctrine was intended for persons engaged in
trade, and since women were not so engaged they were incapable
of maklng an advancement. This remained the law of England until
the Administration of Estates Act of 1925 made the doctrine applicable to "all deceased persons, male or female."23
When the original rationale of the doctrine is reconsidered,
it will be remembered that the general concept of advancements
was to create equality between the children of an intestate parent.24
Some American statutes adhere to this viewpoint and require that
the advancor and the advancee be parent and child,2" but even in
this instance, the courts, in construing the word "child" have given
to the doctrine more liberal interpretation than was probably originally intended. For example, the Supreme Court of Georgia, construing a statute which followed the parent-child concept of advancements, stated that the advancor's intention was the controlling
factor, and that since he had intended a gift to his son-in-law to be
such, it would be treated by the court as an advancement to the
daughter.2 6 This is a prime example of how courts have liberalized
the historical doctrine, while other jurisdictions, including both Vir21 E.g., Rowe v. Rowe, 144 Va. 816, 130 S.E. 771 (1925); (dependance
of infant on father); Lam v. Brock, 92 Va. 173, 23 S.E. 224 (1895) (similarity
of gifts to others); Neil v. Flynn Lumbert Co., 82 W. Va. 24, 95 S.E. 523
(1918)
2 2 (failure of child to claim further participation).
Holt v. Gredrick, 2 P. Wins. 356, 24 Eng. Rep. 763 (1726).
23 1S Geo. 5, c. 23, § 471 (1925).

24
See
25

note 9, supra.
GA. CODE

26 E.g.,

§ 113-1013 (1955).
Ireland v. Dyer, ANN.
133 Ga. 851, 67 S.E. 195

(1910).
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ginia and West Virginia, have liberalized the doctrine by legislative
enactment.
The West Virginia statute states that the concepts of the doctrine of advancements are applicable to ". . any descendant or
collateral relative of a person dying intestate . .,,2"This section

has not always included the term "collateral relative" and originally
applied only to "descendants." The case of Waldron v. Taylor 8
discussed the persons who were to be encompassed by the applicable statute, and found that the 1819 Virginia Code used the term
"children" as indicative of the common law scope of advancements.
The court further found that in the Virginia Code of 1849, a broader
and more comprehensive term "descedant" was used. The court
deduced that the reason for this change in terminology was that
the legislature deemed "children" not broad enough to cover the
indiscriminate interchange of the words "children" and "issue." The
court then found that the term "descendant" included only lineal
descendants of the intestate, excluding collateral relations. In refusing in this case to apply the doctrine to a collateral relative 9 of
the intestate, the court said that if the legislature had intended to
include all heirs at law of the intestate, it should have been so expressed. The legislature obviously did not desire to limit the doctrine
within this decision and changed the statute to read as it now does.
Thus it can be seen that this state has taken an extremely broad
view of the original concept of the doctrine of advancements.
It should be noted, however, that since legislation is designed
to reflect the policies of the people, and since the doctrine of advancements rests on the desired social policy that a father dying
intestate wishes to treat his children with equality, and by its very
terminology the concept is viewed as one whereby a father established
or advances his children in life, there can be little reason for
including within the doctrine collateral relatives. A person does
not always have the same degree of affection for each of his collaterals, nor does he with regularity make a gift for the purpose
of establishing a collateral relative in life, so in actuality, there is
no need to include collaterals within the doctrine.'*
11 W. VA. CODE, ch. 42, art. 4 § 1 (Miehie 1955).
26 52 W. Va. 284, 45 S.E. 336 (1902).
29 In this instance, it was a sister.
30 Elbert, Advancements, 51 MicH. L. Rnv. 665, 694 (1953).
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V. THE ADVANCEMENT TRANSACTION
A.

Those Which Constitute Advancements

An advancement may include real31 or personaP2 property or
both. Statutes in a great majority of jurisdictions, including Virginia3 3
and West Virginia" so provide. Both the Virginia and West Virginia codes include ".

.

. any estate, real or personal . . ." of a

person dying intestate. Any other rule would defeat the equality
concept upon which the doctrine of advancements is based.
An interesting situation arises where a parent takes out a
policy of insurance on his life and names one of his children as
the beneficiary. When the insured dies intestate, the other children
may present the argument that the proceeds of the insurance are
an advancement, and courts of various jurisdictions have so held,
charging the child with the value of the policies as an advancement.3 Arguments against this contention, especially in the situation where the settlor has the right in the policy to change the
beneficiary, have been based on the statement that an advancement must be made in the lifetime of the advancor. However,
applying by analogy the situation where the settlor has the power
to revoke a trust which he has created, and dies without doing
so, the beneficiary being required to account for the proceeds
under the doctrine of advancements," it would seem to reasonably
follow that an insurance policy should constitute an advancement. 7
Courts have held that the use of the parent's land by a child
without the payment of rent therefor is not an advancement to the
6hild on the death of the parent intestate. The Virginia court38
stated that this was not to be considered as an advancement because "... . the possession and use of the land ...

,

being permis-

sive and precarious, could not be considered as an advancement
made towards their [the children's] permanent establishment in
life, nor could they have converted such a right as they held into
112McClintock v. Loisseau, 31 W. Va. 865, 8 S.E. 612 (1888).
1 Watkins v. Young,

72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 84, (1878).

VA. CODE § 64-17 (1950).
4
1 W. VA. CODE, ch. 42, art. 4
5
33

§ 1 (Michie 1955).

" E.g. Culberhouse v. Culberhouse, 68 Ark. 405, 68 S.W. 38 (1900);

Thompson
v. Latimer, 209 Ky. 491, 273 S.W. 65 (1925).
36
Hughey v. Eichelberger, 11 S.C. 36 (1878).
37
6
POWELL,
REAL PROPERTY § 1009 (1958).
3
Christian v. Coleman, 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 30 (1831).
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money to be applied for that purpose." However, where the child
is permitted by the father to rent out the land and to receive the
rents for his or her use, after having had the use of the land without
being required to pay rental to the parent, the rents so received
are considered as advancements. 9
In the instance where a parent makes a gift of land to a child
without giving him a deed therefor, it is possible for a dispute to
arise as to whether this land is to be considered as part of the
estate of the intestate or as an advancement to the child. The issue
is determined by the application of the doctrine of statute of frauds
to the situation. If the child has made improvements sufficient to
withdraw the transaction from the application of the statute, then
the gift is an advancement,4" otherwise, it is treated as a parol gift
of land and is included in the estate of the parent. 4
In relation to these situations it is possible to have a transaction whereby a father makes a parol gift of land to one of his
children, who makes improvements, but insufficient to take the
transaction from the statute of frauds, and who then rents the land
based on the improvements he has made. The Virginia court was
presented with this situation in Chinn v. Murray,42 and the court
there held that in bringing the land into "hotchpot" (in order to
share in the estate of his father) the child did not have to account
for the improvements or the increases that he had made to the
property while in his possession. The theory advanced was that
since he would be held liable for any loss sustained in the value of
the land, that he should have the benefit of any increases in the
value. The court also stated that in the accounting for rents and
profits, the estimate thereof should not be based on the improvements made on the land, inferring from this that the advanced
property should be valued for the purposes of determining the
requisite shares in the estate at the time the advancee received the
property, and not at the time of the death of the advancor. But
43
the court refused to decide this point.

39

Williams v. Stonestreet, 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 559 (1825).

40 Nicholas v. Nicholas, 100 Va. 660, 42 S.E. 669 (1902).
41Dugan v. Gittings, 3 Gill. 138 (Md. 1845).
42

45 Va. (4 Gratt.) 348 (1848).

43 Syllabus Point 4 states as follows: "Quaere:

If the advancement is to
be valued at the time of the advancement, or at the death of the father?"
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Valuation of Advanced Property

From this statement arises the problem as to the valuation to
be placed on the advanced property in determining the child's share
of the estate. The general statement of law on this subject is that
an advancement is to be accounted for at its value when made,"
or if there is a time lapse between the time when made by the advancor and when received by the advancee (as a gift where possession and enjoyment do not come about until some future time),
then the gift is to be valued at the date when it is received.4" The
reason for this rule, and the reason for not computing the value of
the advanced property at the time of the death of the intestate,
is that the gift is complete when made, being the property of the
advancee from the time he receives it. Therefore, to value the property as of another date may be unjust to the advancee and the
other heirs. If the advancee, through improvident care and use of
the property, causes it to deteriorate or be destroyed, it becomes
his loss, and also, the other heirs are not subject to the normal
depreciation of the property while being used by the advancee. By
the same token, this protects the ambitious child who has, by
judicious use of the property, and risk of investment, caused the
property to be increased in value.4
While the rule and the reason therefor seem fairly logical
and uncomplicated, the courts have been plagued with difficulty
in applying the rule to particular situations. For example, where
the parent makes a parol gift of land to the child, and many years
later deeds the land to the child, the court must determine whether
the land should be valued as of the date the child enters into possession of the property, or the date of the conveyance. The majority
of courts hold that the land is valued at the date of possession,"
others saying that the date of conveyance is the proper date.48 The
Virginia court, in expressing the theory of the majority view, made
the following statement:
44Payne v. Payne, 128 Va. 33, 104 S.E. 712 (1920); Kyle v. Conrad,
25 W. Va. 760 (1885).
" Gaylord v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 122 W. Va. 205, 8 S.E.2d 189
(1940).

46Kyle v. Conrad, 25 W. Va. 760 (1885); Puryear v. Cabell, 65 Va.

(24 Graft.) 260 (1874).
47
Ingram v. Ingram, 130 Va. 329, 107 S.E. 653 (1921).
48

Edwards v. Livesay, 203 Ky. 53, 261 S.W. 839 (1924).
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"Confessedly, the parol gift communicated no title, and was
revocable at any time. Nevertheless, the moment the deed
was executed the title passed, and the advancement became
complete and irrevocable, going back by relation to the date
of the parol gift, when the possession of the land and the enjoyment of its rents and profits began. The deed was in law
but an affirmation and ratification of the parol gift, without
change in the control and dominion of the land.... ,
It would seem that from this reasoning and from the reasoning of
the Chinn case,"0 that the same analysis would be applied where
the improvements of the child withdrew the land from the application of the statute of frauds to the transaction.
There would appear to be one logical extention of the general
rule, this in the case of an insurance policy on the life of the advancor, with the advancee being named as the beneficiary. Since
the beneficiary does not come into possession of and enjoyment of
the proceeds of the policy until the death of the insured, he should,
and it is generally so held, account for the amount received from
the policy, and not the value as of the date he received the policy.'
Statutes in some jurisdictions specifically allow the parties to
agree upon the value to be placed on the advanced property, 2
while states having no statutory provision reach the same result by
judicial decision. West Virginia, by the latter method, has said
that where the father and child have agreed as to the value of the
property ".
ment ....

.

. this irrevocably establishes its value as an advance-

The one remaining facet of this section of the doctrine concerns the interest that the advancee is required to pay on his accounting to the estate. The rule is well settled that the advancee
is not compelled to pay interest before the death of the advancor."1
One West Virginia case expresses the reasoning for the rule to be
that the purpose of an advancement is to establish the child in his
49

Ingram v. Ingram, supra note 47.

50 China v. Murray, 45 Va. (4 Gratt.) 348 (1848).

51 Cazassa v. Cazassa, 92 Tenn. 573, 22 S.W. 560 (1893); Contra, Rickenbacker
v. Zimmerman, 10 S.C. 110 (1877).
52
N.Y. DECEDEN'rs E TATE LAW § 85 (1939.)
53 Ingram v. Ingram, supra note 7.
54 Rateliff v. Meade, 184 Va. 328, 35 S.E.2d 114, (1935); Kyle v. Conrad, 25 W. Va. 760 (1885).
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occupation for life, at the most opportune age, and two children
have been equally advanced if this is done, and the older one should
not be penalized by interest payments because of his age. However,
the courts hold that in order to insure equality as between those
entitled to share in the distribution of the estate, interest should
be charged on an advancement from the death of the donor. 5
C.

Other Types of Transactions

Not all transactions between a parent and child constitute advancements. There are various situations which enable the transaction to be distinguished from an advancement.
A sale, with adequate consideration paid to the parent by the
child, does not constitute an advancement to the child.56 This
problem arises most often where land is conveyed from parent to
child by deed, with a recital in the deed of consideration paid and
receipt acknowledged. This recital is prima facie true, although it
is open to contradiction by satisfactory proof, and must be accepted
as true until thus contradicted.5" However, where the deed recites
a pecuniary consideration, it may also be shown by parol evidence
that there was also the consideration of an advancement. 8 Thus
it is possible to show at least a partial advancement where it can
be established that the consideration actually paid was not an adequate and full consideration; but in this instance the consideration
actually paid must be deducted from the value of the land as of
the date of the deed.5 9
It is possible to have a conveyance by a father to one of his
children made for the purpose of satisfying a debt owing to the child
by the parent. If, in this situation, a father conveys property to his
child, even though the value of the property is more than equal
the amount of the debt, the conveyance will be presumed to be
in satisfaction of the debt, if there are no circumstances to prove
a contrary intention." This situation, however, would seem to be
55
1n re Boggs' Estate, 135 W. Va. 288, 63 S.E.2d 497 (1951); Kyle-v.
Conrad,
supra note 54.
56 Osborne v. Richmond, 131 Va. 261, 108 S.E. 560 (1921).
57

Ibid.

DEwvN, DEEDS 829 (3d ed. 1911).
" Harrelson v. Gooden, 229 N.C. 654, 50 S.E.2d 901 (1948); Osborne
v. Richmond,
131 Va. 261, 108 S.E. 560 (1921).
60
Kelly v. Kelly, 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 176 (1828).
58 2
9

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1961

11

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 3 [1961], Art. 5
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

EVol. 63

open to the rationale applied to the cases that are partially a sale
of land and partially an advancement, as previously discussed.
The situation can also be reversed, e.g., where the father, during his lifetime, has loaned money to one of his children. This
creates an enforceable claim by the estate of the intestate against
the child for the amount of the debt, while an advancement creates
no such claim, and is voluntary on the part of the advancee for
the purpose of further sharing in the estate." The West Virginia
court has stated this more concisely in the case of In re Boggs'
Estate6 2 where it was held that ".

.

. an indebtedness due an estate

by an heir or distributee must be paid in any event, but an advancement embraces no obligation to repay." The Pennsylvania court
has perhaps made the most lucid distinction between the two concepts, in the following language:
"A debt is but a set-off in equity against the share of the
distributee. It must therefore be one which is subsisting and
recoverable at the time of the father's death, in order to constitute an available defalcation of the son's distributive share.
An advancement is different, and is not affected by lapse of
time of limitation. It does not operate by way of set-off or
defalcation, but by a legal abstraction of that much from the
child's share in the father's lifetime; therefore leaving the
share that much less at his death. Operating thus by anticipation, it is not controlled by the same defences, such as infancy,
limitations, etc., as prevent the recovery of debts. 63
It is entirely within the realm of possibilities to have a complete
irrevocable gift from the parent to the child that does not constitute
an advancement. A gift may be an advancement, or it may be an
absolute gift, a gift and nothing more. "All advancements are gifts,
but all gifts are not advancements. '64 An advancement differs from
a gift in that the former must be accounted for on the settlement
of the advancor's estate while it is not necessary to account for
the latter.65

Waldron v. Taylor, 52 W. Va. 284, 45 S.E. 336 (1903).
62 Ibid.
63
Hughes' Appeal, 57 Pa. 179 (1868).
64
Hanssen v. Karbe, 234 Mo. App. 663, 115 S.W.2d 109 (1938).
65
Waldron v. Taylor, supra note 61.
61
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VI.

PRESUMPTIONS AND FUNCTION THEREOF

The distinction made between a gift that is an advancement
and the gift that is not introduces the next area of discussion, the
relationship between the doctrine of advancements and certain presumptions that have arisen in this field. As has been previously
stated, the intent of the transferor determines whether a conveyance
is an advancement or a gift. Often property is transferred by a
parent to a child without any outward manifestations of intent on
the part of the former. Succinctly stated by the West Virginia court
66 where there is no intent shown "... . the
in Prichardv. Prichard,

rule is well established that such payments [by a father to a child]
are prima facie advancements, and will be so treated, unless the
presumption in that regard is overcome ..

."'I This is a pre-

sumption based upon (1) the supposed intention and desire of
the parent to correct as far as practical inequalities in his estate;
and (2) the idea the natural affection of a parent is as strong for
one child as it is for another.6"
As is the usual situation within the doctrine of advancements,
the problems arise most frequently in the area of real property transactions, for in this situation is the absence of evidence as to the
intention of the parties most prevalent.
The most commonplace transaction which gives rise to the application of the presumption of an advancement is the unexplained
gift from parent directly to the child. Very early in the history of
this phase of the law is a statement by the Virginia court as to
the effect that would be given to such an unexplained gift. That
court states ".

.

. that a gift in the lifetime of the intestate, unex-

plained, is only a presumption in favor of an advancement, and
makes only a prima facie case, which, with the legal presumption,
may be rebutted by evidence." 69 The court has further substantiated
its position by applying the doctrine of advancements to the situation wherein there was a supposed satisfaction of a legacy. The
Virginia 'court in this instance said that neither law nor good sense
admits the supposition that a parent would make a double provision for the same object, hence, if a parent gave a legacy to a
W. Va. 398, 113 S.E. 256 (1922).
See also, Hedrick v. Harper, 135 W. Va. 47, 62 S.E.2d 265 (1950),
where the court stated that a substantial sum of money given by a father to
his daughter, unexplained, creates a rebuttable presumption that such a gift
was intended
as an advancement.
68
Rowe v. Rowe, 114 Va. 816, 130 S.E. 771 (1925).
69
Watkins v. Young, 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 84 (1878).
66 91
67
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child and afterwards made a provision for the same child by way
of advancement, the common law presumption of an advancement
would be applicable to the legacy. 0 West Virginia courts have said
in essence that it is an unquestioned rule of descent and distribution
that a gift of property from a parent to a child is presumed to be
an advancement.7
The same problem arises where a parent furnishes the consideration for the purchase of property by one of his children from
a third party. Usually, when one person pays for the property that
is held in another's name the latter is said to hold the property in
tust for the benefit of the one who paid the purchase price. 2
However, this is not the case when the parties to the transaction have
the relationship of parent-child, and here the transaction is presumed
to be an advancement, on the basis that the parent makes the conveyance in consideration of obligation to his family. 3 The court in
Young v. Holland"4 quoted with the following statement from the
case of Dyer v. Dyer.7"
"As to purchases made in the names of children, or of persons equally favored, it may be laid down as a general rule
that, where a purchase is made by a parent in the name of a
child, there will be prima facie no resulting trust for the parent,
but on the contrary, a presumption arises that an advancement
was intended."
A third area which gives rise to a presumption in favor of advancements is the situation where a father makes an unexplained
gift, either of money or property, to the spouse of his child. This
most normally occurs when there is a conveyance made by the father
to the husband of his daughter. The earliest recognition of this
problem and its solution in West Virginia came in 1885.1" In determining the issue of presumptions in the field of advancements,
the court looked to the construction of a Kentucky statute (at that
time identical with the applicable West Virginia statute) and quoted
70

Harrison v. Harrison, 171 Va. 224, 198 S.E. 902 (1938).
In re Boggs' Estate, 135 W. Va. 288, 63 S.E.2d 797 (1951); Hedrick
v. Harper, 135 W. Va. 47, 62 S.E.2d 265 (1950); Gaylord v. Hope Natural
122 W. Va. 205, 8 S.E.2d 189 (1940).
Gas Co.,
7
2 Ban], of United States v. Carrington, 34 Va. (7 Leigh) 566 (1836).
73 Clark v. Spain, 119 Va. 58, 89 S.E. 130 (1916); Young v. Holland,
117 Va. 433, 84 S.E. 687 (1915).
74 117 Va. 433, 84 S.E. 637 (1915).
7
75W. &T. Eq. Cas. 266.
6 Kylo v. Conrad, 25 W. Va. 760 (1885).
71
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at length from the Kentucky case of Barbour v. Taylor's Heirs,""
arriving at the following conclusion:
"A settlement on a son for life, remainder to his wife and
then to his children, should be considered as an advancement to the son to the whole extent of the value of the entire
estate....

These doctrines ...

virtually recognize as a con-

trolling principle the intestate father's intention; and therefore
virtually decide that whatever he intended as an advancement,
and would have so treated, at his death should generally, if
not invariable, be considered without regard to the mode of
making or securing the actual enjoyment of it, concerning
all which he should be the sole arbiter. And therefore there
could be no doubt that, if a father should vest in a stranger
the title to property, in trust for a daughter, the estate thus
intended for her by such a provision should generally be
,78
deemed an advancement ....
The court concluded that "... the intention of the donor to advance
his daughter will be presumed from the fact that he conveys to
the husband upon the sole consideration of the existence of the
marriage-relation between them. .... ,,79
This same theory has been used to declare that the payment
of the debts of his son-in-law constitutes an advancement by a
father to his daughter,"0 and a deed of land to the son-in-law, wherein no mention was made of the daughter, also raised the presumption of an advancement. 8' The conveyance of land made without
mention of consideration, or for merely nominal consideration, will
raise the presumption of an advancement, 82 and generally, where
the recited consideration is "love and affection," either for a child
or grandchild of the advancor, the conveyance will be presumed
83
to be an advancement to the child.
VII. APPLICATION TO PARTIAL INTESTACY
The most difficult problem created by the statute relating to
advancements is the segment which states that the law will apply to
77 39
78

Ky. (9 Dana) 84 (1839).

1 d. at 86.
79
8 Ibid.

oMcDearman v. Hodnett, 83 Va. 281, 2 S.E. 643 (1887).

81 Bruce v. Slemp, 82 Va. 352, 4 S.E. 692 (1887).
82

83

Neil v. Flynn Lumber Co., 82 W. Va. 24, 95 S.E. 523 (1918).
Kyle v. Conrad, 25 W. Va. 760 (1885).
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the estate of any .. . person dying intestate as to his estate, or any
part thereof . . ." and to any descendant or collateral relative of
such person who has ". . . received from such intestate in his life-

time, or under his will.. ." any property, by way of advancement.

4

The partial intestacy problem arose in the Virgina Code of
1849, when the common law theory of advancements was broadened by legislative enactment, and subsequently became a part of
the West Virginia law.85 Most jurisdictions hold that the concept
of advancements does not apply to the situation where there is a
partial intestacy. This result was reached by holding that the purpose of the doctrine is to effectuate a presumed intent of a parent
that his children should share equally, but, where a parent disposes
of his estate by will his directions are given, and if a child receives
more than his proportionate share, the parent did not intend for
them to share equally. 6 The English cases decided prior to the
Administration of Estates Act of 1925 also reached this conclusion,
but used as the basis for this the reasoning that since there was
a will, the testator did not die intestate."' Since 1925, English courts
have applied the doctrine to cases wherein there is only a partial
intestacy on the part of the parent.
The Virginia court entered into a learned and complete discussion of advancements and partial intestacy in the case of Wilson
v. Miller.8" Although the court was not deciding an issue directly
in point the statements, reasoning and logic of the court are applicable to the question of partial intestacy. In this case the testator
had four children, and had made considerable advancements to two
of them. He died, leaving a will devising the estate to the four in
almost equal segments. After his death, a posthumous child was
born (pretermitted by the will). A statute provided that this child
would be entitled to such "portion of the father's estate" as if he
"had died intestate," and the devisees were to contribute ratably
from their legacies and devises toward this share. The issue presented to the court was whether or not the doctrine of "hotchpot"
was applicable to force the children who had received advancements
to account for them in determining the "intestate" share of the
84 W. VA. CODE,

ch. 42, art. 4 § 1 (Michie 1955). (Emphasis added.)

"-'Payne v. Payne, 128 Va. 33, 104 S.E. 712 (1920).
Elder, Advancements, 52 MIcH. L. REv. 231, 239 (1953).
87 Walton v. Walton, 33 Eng. Rep. 543 (1807).
88 1 P. & H. 353 (Va. 1855).
86
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pretermitted child, and in deciding this the court found it necessary
to determine whether the doctrine of advancements was applicable
to situations other than complete intestacy on the part of the parent.
On the one hand it was contended that the after-born child had
the rights to participate in the advancements made to any legatee
or devisee in the lifetime of the father, to the same extent as if he
had died wholly intestate. On the other hand it was contended
that the pretermitted child was entitled only to a full share of the
estate of which the father died seized. The court thoroughly considered these problems as raised by counsel, and in reaching the
solution that the doctrine of advancements did not apply to this
set of facts, made statements pertinent to the issue here under
discussion:
".. [A] plenary testamentary power was given to every
person deemed capable of exercising it, and when exercised
according to the prescribed forms and solemnities of the law,
no matter how capriciously or unjustly, no matter who were
the objects of testamentary bounty, the act was valid-voluntas
stat pro lege-but if any one chose not to exercise this testamentary power, and to die intestate, the law stepped in, and
by the statute of descents and distributions disposed of his
estate, real and personal; and in doing so, it adopted as its
rule and guide the principle of equality.
"To produce this equality there was incorporated in the
statute the provision requiring advancements to be brought
in *'89

mn.

..

."'

The opinion also noted that "it cannot seriously be gainsayed or
questioned that the doctrine of advancements was inapplicable to
a case of partial intestacy. . . .90 Itis important to note that the
court made these statements in 1855, and although the fact situation of the case arose prior to 1849, the court, at the time it handed
down its opinion, was fully appraised of the statute passed in
1849, which made the doctrine of advancements applicable to partial
intestacy.
Since the time of the passage of the statute, the Virginia court
has construed and applied the doctrine twice, both cases being
8

9Id. at 388.

90

1d. at 390.
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decided on the same day, effectively summarizing the state law on
the subject. The first of these, Payne v. Payne,9 1 involved a situation
where the father had made disproportionate advancements to certain
of his children during his lifetime, and disposed of the larger items
of his estate by means of a holographic will, saying nothing in his
will about the residue of his estate. The court applied the statute,
and found that all descendants who desired to share in the residue
of the estate had to account for their advancements. The court,
commenting on the statute, made the following statement:
". .. The statute does not assume to interfere with the
freedom of the ancestor to prefer one or more of his descendants
in the distribution of his estate, but applies only where, having
distributed a part of his estate to them, he has left part of it
undisposed of, to be distributed under the statute of descents
and distributions. In such case the statute, in its endeavor to
accomplish that equality which is equity, equalizes the shares
of those descendants who claim to share in the distribution of
the property which has been undisposed of, by requiring that
those who have received advancements shall first have their
value taken into account . . .
This appears to be a very interesting justification of the rationale
of equality and intent, a justification ever more in evidence in the
Poff case93 decided by the court later in the day wherein the testator
clearly stated that he was giving certain of his property to his

children, and desired the remainder to go by the laws of intestacy.
Here also, the court, for the avowed purpose of the equality of
descent and distribution, said that the property so given under the
will was to be treated as an advancement.
There is one Virginia case, not referred to in either the Payne
case or the Pof case which raises certain questions as to those decisions. In this earlier case, Bienler v. Bienler,94 the testator disposed
of certain of his property by will, and directed that the remainder
be disposed of in accordance with the laws of intestate succession.
The court refused to consider the specific disposition as an advancement, and used an extremely logical reason for this, saying that
. in a case like this, where the testator has left a will, no
91
128 Va. 33, 104 S.E. 712 (1920).
92
1d. at 40, 104 S.E. at 714.
93 Poff v. Poff, 128 Va. 62, 104 S.E. 719 (1920).
94

87 Va. 300, 12 S.E. 713 (1891).
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matter what may be the rule in other cases, no
intention to advance can arise from the mere
partial intestacy. . . ."I' The very purpose of
said was to correct inequalities, insofar as the
to do.

presumption of an
circumstance of a
the will the court
testator desired so

The views presented by those courts which refuse to apply the
doctrine to situations other than complete intestacy present as a
basis for this view somewhat the same idea as was presented by
the Virginia court in applying the doctrine to partial intestacy. The
Iowa court9 6 expressed the majority view by stating that no property
given as an advancement could be taken into account in the distribution of an estate where the parent leaves a will, even though
the will did not dispose of all of his property, and stated that:

The reason for this rule is obvious. If it were otherwise, it
would be impossible for one to make a will which, in cases of
partial intestacy, would give to one heir more than to another.
The testator is conclusively presumed to have considered the
advancements and the bequests made in the will collectively,
and to have made distribution as he intended to make it. He
need not treat his heirs or devisees as standing on an
equal footing, and may give to one more than to another, or
may equalize the matter, as he sees fit in the will. The doctrine
of advancements rests upon the presumed desire of an ancestor
to equalize his estate among his heirs. When he makes his
will, he expresses his intention in this respect, and his desires
should be followed . . ."I"
.....

It would appear that from the rationale and reasoning of the common law concept of the doctrine of advancements, and from the
broad social policy of equality among the members of the family
upon which the very foundation of the doctrine is based, that the
intent of the parent is more accurately and reasonably effectuated
by following the directions given by the testator in his will to the

95

96
97

Id. at 303, 12 S.E. at 715.
Gilmore v. Jenkins, 129 Iowa 686, 106 N.W. 193 (1906).
1d. at 689, 106 N.W. at 194.
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exclusion of the application of advancements to the situation wherein
there is a partial intestacy.98
CONCLUSIONS

The doctrine of advancements, unknown originally at common law, is a creature of statute, both in England and in the United
States, the statutes of the latter being patterned in most instances
after the former. The first advancement statute was passed as a
part of the English Statute of Distributions in 167099
The original conception of the doctrine made it applicable to
parent and child, but statutes today have enlarged and broadened
this doctrine to include, in West Virginia and Virginia, both descendants and collateral relatives. The Model Probate Code' 0 has
suggested that the doctrine be applied to any person "who, if the
intestate had died at the time of making the advancement, would
be entitled to inherit a part of his estate."
The social policy behind the doctrine is equality among the
children of the intestate in the absence of a statement by the parent
of inequality in the form of a will. West Virginia has broadened
this policy by making the doctrine applicable to situations wherein
there is a partial intestacy. Since this doctrine was originally applicable only to children, it would seem than an extension by the
courts and legislatures to person other than children is contrary
to the social policies evidenced by the doctrine at its inception.
In most jurisdictions the courts have, by judicial decision,
created a presumption that any inter vivos transfer of a substantial
amount of money or property between the parent and child is a
prima facie advancement, on the basis that the natural affection
of a parent towards his children is equal. By this presumption, all
children share equally in the estate of the intestate parent.
98

It is open to question whether the West Virginia court would apply
the doctrine of advancements in the following situations: (1) The will is
invalid as to certain portions and for this reason a part of the estate passes
by intestate succession; (2) The testator directs that a portion of his property
is to pass by the laws of intestacy; and (3) The testator directs that.his property is to go to those persons who would take under the laws of descent and
distribution. The logical result would seem to be that the first two would
constitute partial intestacy under the terms of the statute, while the third
would be only extrinsic evidence as to the distribution of the estate.
99 22 & 23 Car. 2, ch. 10 (1670).
00 MODEL PROBATE CODE § 29. See, SYMEs & BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PRO-

BATE LAw 65-66 (1949).
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However, the intent of the advancor in this situation is the
determining feature, and this intent may be expressed, either prior
or subsequent to the act, or implied from the circumstances surrounding the act, and may be shown by extrinsic evidence.
It is felt that the doctrine of advancements as originally conceived had merit, and the abolishment today of all legislation in
relation to the doctrine would not lessen the misunderstanding
among heirs of persons dying intestate. However, the danger of these
quarrels could be decreased by a limitation on the application of
the doctrine to the children and grandchildren of the intestate, and
a requirement that the doctrine be inapplicable to any situation
other than complete intestacy.
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